# PLATINUM INTERNATIONAL FUND



**Kerr Neilson** Managing Director


# **PERFORMANCE**

The Fund has continued to be remarkably stable during these highly turbulent times. Of importance was what one avoided, as much as what one owned.

Thankfully we continued to avoid the western financials, resource producers and energy plays, and benefited from favouring the strong currencies, in particular the Japanese yen. Among our stocks we recorded mixed weakness. Companies with debt levels that would normally be regarded as tolerable were harshly treated early in the quarter on concerns about refinancing risk but these subsequently recovered strongly. Hence, the Fund was up 2.9% for the quarter, up 10.6% for the last six months and down for the year by 7.4%.

Though clients lost money, we certainly gave them more protection than was afforded by most of our peers and, as well, can report an outcome that is superior to that typically achieved in the Australian market. For the record, the MSCI All Country World Index (A\$) was down 12.2% for the quarter, -10.9% for the last six months and -27.2% for the year. Since inception the return from the Platinum International Fund has been 14.3% compound pa versus 4.4% compound pa for the MSCI World Index.

sector Qu	JARTER	1 YEAR
TELECOMMUNICATIONS	5%	-19%
UTILITIES	2%	-12%
HEALTH CARE	1%	-1%
CONSUMER STAPLES	-2%	-4%
INDUSTRIALS	-12%	-31%
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY	-13%	-27%
ENERGY	-14%	-27%
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY	-15%	-30%
MATERIALS	-19%	-40%
FINANCIALS	-25%	-42%



# **CURRENCIES**

We reversed some of our US dollar exposure during the quarter in favour of the Euro and continued to trust in the Japanese yen. This has worked well but the untangling of debt, which we have previously alluded to as the supporting mechanism for the US dollar, remains intact and this will guide our positioning for a while yet. The Australian dollar has been trading more strongly during the quarter but at this stage it seems unlikely to strengthen much past the mid-70s range to the US dollar. In retrospect we re-entered the Australian dollar hedge a little early but with some 25% of the portfolio hedged, it has proved beneficial recently.

REGION	DEC 2008	SEP 2008
NORTH AMERICA	24%	25%
EUROPE	23%	23%
APAN	20%	18%
ASIA AND OTHER	17%	17%
CASH	16%	17%
SHORTS	21%	25%

#### **SHORTING**

The market rewarded us for short selling defensives in the packaged goods industry, some boldly priced transport intermediaries and a REIT ETF (real estate investment trust exchange traded fund), as well as the Russell 2000 Index.

We have gradually reduced exposure to index shorts like the Russell and replaced them with specific company shorts. Overall the level of shorting has been reduced to around 21% but we continue to migrate to those areas still priced as impregnable and imperturbable.

## CHANGES TO THE PORTFOLIO

We have been relatively inactive in value terms during the quarter and have tended to use the high volatility to either add to core positions or to trim those that moved out of line with their peers. While marginal in terms of its impact on the overall portfolio, the interweek moves have been colossal and have allowed us to take advantage of senseless panic.

STOCK	INDUSTRY	DEC 2009
MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL		220200
SIEMENS	ELECTRICAL	3.4%
MICROSOFT CORP	TECHNOLOGY	3.2%
CISCO SYSTEMS	TECHNOLOGY	2.7%
BARRICK GOLD	GOLD	2.5%
SANOFI-AVENTIS	HEALTH CARE	2.4%
HUTCHISON WHAMPOA T	ELCO/TRANSPORT	2.2%
JOHNSON & JOHNSON	HEALTH CARE	2.0%
MERCK & CO	HEALTH CARE	1.9%
OBAYASHI CORP	CONSTRUCTION	1.8%
JGC	CONSTRUCTION	1.8%
BOMBARDIER	TRANSPORT	1.7%
HENKEL KGAA	CONSUMER	1.7%
DENSO CORP	AUTO	1.7%
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS	ELECTRICAL	1.6%
EBAY	TECHNOLOGY	1.6%
HENDERSON LAND DEV	PROPERTY	1.5%
LAGARDERE	MEDIA	1.5%
PPR	RETAIL	1.5%
PERNOD RICARD	BEVERAGE	1.5%

#### COMMENTARY

As we look back over this year, even those who identified the reckless extravagance that resulted from easy money<sup>1</sup> would surely be surprised at how quickly the environment changed and at the damage wrought

 $<sup>^{</sup>m 1}$  Regular readers of this quarterly will be only too familiar with our bleating about cheap and abundant money and forewarnings of the likely consequences.



to the global economic order. George Soros, prescient as ever, in his article in the *Financial Times* (22 January 2008) pointed to the crazy belief in the perfection of markets when so much evidence supports the idea that they are inherently unstable and need close supervision. His main point, however, was that we had come to the end of a 60 year credit boom and that "the ability of the (US) financial authorities to stimulate the economy is constrained by the willingness of the rest of the world to accumulate additional dollar reserves".

The Fed, following a pattern of ever quicker responses to economic distress, acted well-ahead of any pronouncements of a recession<sup>2</sup> and by mid-December, had dropped rates to virtually zero. They have further entered the unknown by directly buying long-term treasuries in order to reduce interest rates right along the yield curve. This is already beginning to help the refinancing of mortgages at lower rates and has begun to improve the level of activity in the corporate debt markets. (As an aside, this is in effect punishing all those savers who had conjured up hopes of saving for their future security, but in this politically charged panic, that is the least of the Fed's concerns. Followers of the Austrian school of economics view the Keynesian approach adopted by the Fed as tantamount to adding fat to the fire because they believe that without saving and concomitant investment, an economy starves itself of growth potential, and condemns itself to weak formation of wealth.)

We have entered the unknown to the extent that we cannot know how enthusiastic lenders will be to extend credit nor how willing borrowers will be to take on more debt. We should not forget that the level of outstanding interest bearing obligations in the US now exceeds 350% of GDP. The consumer accounts for nearly four tenths of this figure (where servicing it absorbs 14% of disposable income), the government one sixth, and the balance is owed by the financial sector and ordinary businesses. This compares with a total figure of 155% in the early 1980s when consumer debt accounted for about one

third. It may be instructive to note that subsequent to the Japanese credit bubble that peaked in 1990, domestic banks failed to increase the net level of loans for the following 18 years. This is starkly different to the pattern in the English speaking world where for over 50 years there has been an almost incessant increase in the use of debt. Our observation is that most Western banks are extremely thinly capitalised and will have difficulty stepping into the breach. For example, the top 19 US banks had net equity at the end of September 2008 of US\$552 billion, implying a Tier 1 capital ratio of 4.4%: quite slender when set against the declines in housing values and before the news is out on their commercial books.

As 2009 unfolds, the performance of the manufacturing sector may receive rapt attention. As we toured European companies in mid-December, there was the recurring observation that orders fell-off sharply from mid-October and that in November and December, to receive orders at all was a source of jubilation. The effect of this hiatus will be revealed in the next reporting season. Of concern is not the one-off reduction of activity as destocking takes effect, but the actuated feedback loop as it impinges on employment, involuntary working capital increases, bad debts and the need for additional funding. It is precisely this concern about business confidence that is motivating pre-emptive action by the Fed and other Central Banks.

Some have expressed concern about the printing of money (also known as quantitative easing) but our view is that the sheer magnitude of debt in many developed economies will militate against pricing power and hence the risk of inflation is some way off. We should all keep at the back of our minds, however, that history is studded with examples of governments abrogating their obligations when cornered and indeed, we suggest that the intractability of the obligations now being incurred will in time drive those in power to follow an expedient route. Equities in such an event, while not perhaps ideal, will be a lot more interesting than cash or bonds.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Though US unemployment has been rising all year, the official declaration of a recession only occurred in the fourth quarter.

#### **OUTLOOK**

We are asked about the timing of an equity market bottom. It is not possible to oblige. What we see is an overlapping three phase bear market. The first phase was the seizure of the credit markets. This is now well on the way to being resolved.

The second phase is the collapse of profitability led by commodity producers and manufacturers of durable consumer goods but also apparent in the service sector such as retailers, media and the like. Some will be largely immune such as power, water and communication utilities. As noted last quarter, analysts are lagging well-behind fund managers in their revisions of earnings but the pattern of downgrades is now accelerating and we would guess that by the end of the first quarter 2009 reporting season, reality will have truly set in. A factor to be watched over the longer term is the damage which may result from governmental intervention to prop-up ailing businesses.

The third phase may reveal a change in portfolio and geographic preferences. We may already have seen some of this with the voluntary or forced liquidation of equity positions as investors increased their cash holdings or sold them as a hedge against less liquid assets such as property and commercial paper. It would be surprising if this down phase is not marked by investors questioning the true merit of owning shares and some vowing never to participate again!

In the meantime we are quite upbeat. The new administration in the US is bound to spend liberally to try to avert a deep recession. The temptation may be to favour expediency over the longer serving benefits of bolstering the country's infrastructure. However, governments worldwide can be expected to deficit spend with some emphasis on capital works. At the same time the effect of a lower oil price is highly beneficial to consumer incomes and this should lift consumer confidence.

From the compositional angle, in general terms we still favour Asia over the Western hemisphere. Not that Asia will escape a reduction in foreign direct investment, nor deteriorating trade surpluses but their state finances are in good shape, their banks' solvency ratios are barely affected by the credit crunch/writeoffs and of course, bank funding tends to be from domestic sources. Countries such as India may face a weaker Rupee to offset its less favourable fiscal position, but on the other hand, it has far less exposure to external trade than say China.

### For most markets, the technical factors are also encouraging.

- The reopening of the corporate bond markets will relieve refinancing risk concerns for companies with above average debt levels.
- · Company valuation measures, such as price to book value or enterprise value to capital employed, are back to levels last seen in 1985.
- The relative value of defensive companies compared to those which have cyclical earnings are at an historic extreme as investors have sought the comfort of predictability.

A survey of investor sentiment by Merrill Lynch<sup>3</sup> reveals that most professional investors already expect corporate profits to "deteriorate strongly" and hence one can surmise that this is priced into most companies valuations.

Portfolio cash levels are also high by historic comparison with figures out of the US suggesting they are equivalent to 75% of the US equity capitalisation.

Lastly, selling pressure seems to be abating and share prices are tending to move sideways-to-up against a crescendo of bad tidings. Historically, iconic insolvencies have often been closely related to market lows; in this instance we can consider Lehman and the issue of the big three auto companies.

The coming months will require some agility and we will look to the opportunity to continue to winnow the portfolio for those superior companies which, even though their profits may come under pressure, will be able to generate free cash flows. The shorts are correspondingly being directed at companies at extreme valuations which reflect their use as defensive hiding places.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Merrill Lynch Fund Manager global survey with 206 respondents from 5-11 December 2008.

#### **NOTES**

- 1. The investment returns are calculated using the Fund's unit price and represent the combined income and capital return for the specific period. They are net of fees and costs (excluding the buy-sell spread and any investment performance fee payable), are pre-tax and assume the reinvestment of distributions. The investment returns shown are historical and no warranty can be given for future performance. You should be aware that past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. Due to the volatility of underlying assets of the Funds and other risk factors associated with investing, investment returns can be negative (particularly in the short-term).
- 2. The investment returns depicted in the graphs are cumulative on A\$10,000 invested in the relevant Fund since inception relative to their Index (in A\$) as per below:

Platinum International Fund:

Inception 1 May 1995, MSCI All Country World Net Index

Platinum Unhedged Fund:

Inception 31 January 2005, MSCI All Country World Net Index

Platinum Asia Fund:

Inception 3 March 2003, MSCI All Country Asia ex Japan Net Index

Platinum European Fund:

Inception 1 July 1998, MSCI All Country Europe Net Index

Platinum Japan Fund:

Inception 1 July 1998, MSCI Japan Net Index

Platinum International Brands Fund:

Inception 18 May 2000, MSCI All Country World Net Index

Platinum International Health Care Fund:

Inception 10 November 2003, MSCI All Country World Health Care Net Index

Platinum International Technology Fund:

Inception 18 May 2000, MSCI All Country World Information Technology Index

(nb. the gross MSCI Index was used prior to 31 December 1998 as the net MSCI Index did not exist).

The investment returns are calculated using the Fund's unit price. They are net of fees and costs (excluding the buy-sell spread and any investment performance fee payable), pre-tax and assume the reinvestment of distributions. It should be noted that Platinum does not invest by reference to the weightings of the Index. Underlying assets are chosen through Platinum's individual stock selection process and as a result holdings will vary considerably to the make-up of the Index. The Index is provided as a reference only.

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